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Political Party Advertising and Marketing Strategies in the 2015 UK Election.1  
Janine Dermody (Oxford Brookes) 
 
Overview 
This chapter evaluates the ad message strategies and creative executions of two major UK 
parties - The Conservatives and Labour. To what extent did the advertising connect with the 
overarching election marketing strategies employed by the parties? To what degree did the 
advertising engage the electorate to address their hopes and fears, thereby building their trust? 
To answer these questions, this examination utilises critical analysis of multisource evidence 
including research studies, documentary evidence, expert conference speakers, discussions 
and follow-up questions and commentary on social media. The chapter identifies good and 
bad practice and the strategic role advertising plays in the marketing of elections.  
 
Core Contextual Influences on the Campaign Messages 
Each election has its unique circumstances that influence the design and execution of each 
party’s campaign strategy. The introduction to this book presents this electoral landscape. 
However, there are two issues noteworthy of consideration here because they significantly 
influenced the advertising campaigns. These are technology integration and the mood of the 
nation.  
 
1 To cite: Dermody, J. (2016). Political Party Advertising and Marketing Strategies in the 2015 UK Election. In 
D. Lilliker & M. Pack (Eds.), Political Marketing and the 2015 UK General Election. Palgrave Macmillan.  
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 For the first time strategically integrated digitally advanced messages were proffered 
by the major political parties across media channels, particularly from the Conservatives. 
However this digital innovation was compromised by the narrow targeting of messages to 
marginal seats that rendered the parties election ad messages invisible for a significant 
proportion of the electorate (Dermody 2015).  
The nations’ mood was extensively influenced by the size of the country's debt, the 
fragility of Britain’s economic recovery and job opportunities and austerity measures 
resulting in major cuts to public services.  Tension and fear were evident among the less 
economically advantaged, with a greater gap between rich and poor during the lifetime of the 
previous parliament. Immigration, whilst being highly politically sensitive, did not dominate 
public consciousness so strongly. Where an anti-immigration sentiment did exist, this 
correlated with perceived limited job opportunities and inadequate and/or unequal access to 
public services. The economy therefore had to be central to the major parties election 
communication.  
 Within this landscape, the parties needed to gauge how best to strategically 
present their messages – using positivity to build hope or negativity to engender fear. Before 
presenting the campaigns, a synopsis of research on positive and negative attack advertising 
is given to inform analysis of the parties advertising messages.  
 
A Critical Synopsis of the Persuasiveness of Negative Attack versus Positive Election 
Advertising Messages  
 
The Persuasiveness of Negative Attack Ad Messages  
There is an evidence rich case for the persuasive power of negative attack political ads 
(Dermody and Hanmer-Lloyd 2011; Franz and Ridout 2007, 2010; Ruiter, Kessels, Peters & 
Kok 2014). This originates from research signalling disliking a party influences voting 
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decision-making attitudes and voter behaviour more strongly than liking (Dermody & 
Scullion 2001), particularly for individual impression formation and evaluative decision-
making. Thus negative messages, particularly personality attack ads, influence the electorate 
to judge attacked candidates to be less well-qualified, successful, honest, serious, sincere and 
more financially irresponsible. Accordingly attack ads are deemed to be more persuasive than 
positive ad messages, and win elections. 
Using attack rhetoric illuminates and strengthens the ‘cognitive footprint’ of these ad 
messages because it increases their visibility and accessibility to become more memorable 
and comprehensible. Consequently the informative and motivating characteristics of attack 
messages engage the electorate, expanding voter turnout (Brader, 2005; Carraro, et al., 2010; 
Finkel & Geer, 1998; Geer & Geer, 2003; Martin, 2004). However these cognitively 
engaging effects are statistically weak and require circumspection. Additionally attack ads are 
powerful in arousing emotions (Brader 2006; Westen 2007), thereby motivating voting 
intention, particularly when emotions are positive. For example, partisans’ happiness that the 
negative ad has highlighted ‘lies’ from opposing leaders or parties; and non-partisans 
satisfaction that the negative ads have identified weaknesses with a party’s policies or 
character of a leader. For non-partisans, attack ads can justify and facilitate their choice of 
alternative party or leader, thereby easing their voting decision-making (Dermody, Hanmer-
Lloyd, Koenig-Lewis & Zhao 2014).  Attack ads must be ‘evidence-based’ however, or risk a 
backlash effect entailing voting for the opposition because of anger towards the sponsor’s 
unsubstantiated and personal attacks on leaders or candidates.  
In contrast, alternative studies on attack advertising indicate it increases political 
negativity, voter alienation and the ignominy of political argument, triggering a democratic 
deficit – a significant decline in participation and democratic accountability (Ansolabehere, et 
al., 1999; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Kaid, et al., 2000; Schenck-
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Hamlin, et al., 2000; Stevens, 2009).This is because attack advertising contributes to 
increasing political cynicism, declining political trust and reduced personal political efficacy 
and a lack of hope for the future (Dermody, Hanmer-Lloyd & Scullion 2011; Dermody, 
Hanmer-Lloyd, Koenig-Lewis & Zhao 2014; Schenck-Hamlin, Procter & Rumsey 2000). 
These effects are further exacerbated by the permanent campaign. Overall an avoidance 
mindset is created where candidates are perceived to be undeserving of office and the 
political system is rejected because it contains unworthy and untrustworthy leaders. While 
this evidence has been accused of being overly dramatic, the demobilising effects of attack 
ads and mobilising effects of positive election ads are confirmed.   
 
The Influence of Positive Election Ad Messages 
Research on the positive effects of political advertising advance understanding in two areas: 
candidate evaluation and political motivation (Brader 2006; Carraro, Gawronski & Castelli 
2010; Matthews & Dietz-Uhler 1998; Westen 2007).  
The findings on candidate evaluation focus on candidate likeability and competence. 
With respect to likeability of candidates, individuals have been found to feel closer to 
politicians utilising positive self-promotion messages not negative ones aiming to undermine 
opponents. Regarding competence, candidates who employ negative advertising campaigns 
and not positive ones are judged to have higher competence, but are less likeable. As a 
consequence these candidates are perceived to be more powerful and agenic, but unfriendly 
compared with candidates articulating positive messages. Interestingly studies show explicit 
dislike of politicians who extensively use negative messages; however such candidates would 
still receive voting support. This is not a contradiction; voters are implicitly evaluating 
candidates’ aptitude to govern versus their positive human characteristics. Essentially 
5 
 
political leaders must be politically competent, but it is not critical for them to be liked; a 
combination of the two, however, is compelling.  
Studies on political motivation show individuals’ political enthusiasm can be 
stimulated by the neuropsychological effect of exposure to positive ads portraying success. 
This can increase eagerness to vote and enhance interest in the election campaign. 
Furthermore, these ads not only motivate those already interested and involved in politics, but 
can also facilitate some degree of universal mobilisation. Accordingly researchers conclude 
positive ads are influential in stimulating political involvement because they connect with the 
electorates’ and politicians’ hopes and ambitions for the future of their country and the 
stewardship of leaders who are competent (and liked). Overall then, the strength of positive 
election advertising is its capacity to create a sense of optimism and trust and stimulate 
electoral participation.   
 
The Conservative 2015 Advertising Campaign  
The Conservatives proved themselves to be the masters of election marketing in 2015. Their 
campaign was described as one of the most ‘disciplined, focused and ruthless campaign in 
the history of British politics’ (Swinford 2015). The Conservatives built their election 
strategy on five critical issues: the threat to Britain and the economy with a SNP Labour 
‘alliance’; the merits of the Conservative long term economic plan; utilising the positive 
persona of their leader David Cameron; ruthlessly attacking the Liberal Democrats; and 
relentlessly sticking to their strategic election marketing plan. Hence, for M&C Saatchi, the 
Conservative’s ad agency, the strategic role of the advertising was to energise Conservative 
voters to vote Conservative and persuade floating voters that voting for any other party was 
an unacceptable risk. To this end, the targeted advertising audience was voters in marginal 
seats and the media (influencing a largely partisan press and the more independent 
6 
 
broadcasters to set the terms of the debate) (Sinclair 2015). The agency used data from 
YouGov and Ipsos Mori between 2014-2015 to inform their advertising messages and base 
them on ‘fact’. This factual evidence reported who the public trusted the most with the 
economy and who would be the most capable Prime Minister; on both questions David 
Cameron was the outright winner (Sinclair 2015). Combining this evidence with the five 
critical issues of the overarching communication strategy, the foundations of the advertising 
campaign were established.  
Accordingly, the Conservative advertising focused on conveying the threat of Labour 
sneaking to power with the support of the Scottish National Party (SNP). Labour would then 
become a puppet government as the SNP extracted ‘payback’ in advancing the interests of 
Scotland (embedding the suggestion this would be at the expense of the needs of England). 
This message was constantly and ruthlessly repeated across all their campaigning platforms 
as they effectively established this media agenda in-line with their ad strategy and motivated 
Conservative partisans and swing voters that this risk was too great and thus actively voting 
Conservative was critical. M&C Saatchi believe that posters are an effective platform upon 
which to launch negative attacks on the opposition (Sinclair 2015) and the SNP threat 
enabled them to generate a series of attack creative executions to trigger an argument and 
persuade their audience of this danger by manipulating their fears. Hence, in personality 
attacks on Labour leader Ed Miliband, a succession of Conservative poster and digital ads 
featured Miliband trapped in the pocket of the SNP – waiting to do their bidding and as a 
puppet dancing to the tune of Alex Salmond and Nicola Sturgeon.  The argument that this 
message generated was widely considered to be a decisive factor in Ed Miliband’s declining 
popularity and Labour losing the election. 
The Conservative’s record on the economy was fundamental to their communication 
strategy. On the advice of political advisor - Jim Messina - they daily asserted they were the 
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party with the long-term plan for effective economic recovery; stating Labour did wreck the 
economy and would crash it again. Thus their digital ads proclaimed: ‘A recovering economy: 
don’t let Labour wreck it’, with Labour personified by demolition machines. These policy-
attack ads featured no voiceover, simply the message and the crash of the demolition ball. 
The credibility of the Conservatives message was underpinned by stronger economic growth 
compared with other G7 nations. In an earlier related economy ad that focused on the 
Conservatives, Cameron declared the country needed to stay on the road to stronger 
economic growth. ‘Let’s stay on the road to a stronger economy’ featured the greatness of 
Britain (symbolised by the Union Jack flag) on a gently undulating road back to prosperity 
(symbolised by a lush green landscape personifying England; albeit the road was in 
Germany). All the economy advertising rhetoric featured an upbeat David Cameron 
displaying his energy and belief in himself and his party to succeed in making Britain’s 
economy strong again. Hence this advertising entailed a mix of message styles; negative 
messages that attacked Miliband and Labour and positive messages praising themselves for 
their ongoing economic successes and their fortitude in seeing a difficult job done. As 
discussed within the Labour campaign below, both the economy and the SNP were major 
failures of Labour’s election marketing campaign. 
Unlike Labour, who were essentially unable to use their leader to front their 
communication in this election and the two previous general elections (2005, 2010), the 
Conservatives had a very valuable asset in David Cameron. They realised he was far more 
popular with the electorate than the party itself, hence he featured across the entirety of their 
election marketing campaign. Compounding this strength, the message he continually gave 
was that he, as the leader of the Conservatives, could be trusted with economic recovery and 
easing the burden on families (thus also stealing ground from Labour). Hence, even within an 
inherently attacking message, David Cameron provided the positive element of the message 
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that said ‘you can trust ME’. This combination of positivity and negativity throughout the 
advertising and wider communication messages was a highly potent strategy. Furthermore, 
because they used digital technology so effectively, for example the symbiotic interaction of 
their ad messages in election campaign films, across social media, interactive websites, etc, 
the power of the Conservatives messages was enhanced considerably. The flexibility 
provided by digital technology also meant that the Cameron asset remained strong. For 
example when opinion polls showed he was less ‘emotional’ compared with Ed Miliband, his 
message style was rapidly revised to portray his political passion, which increased positive 
public opinion. This is supported by neurological research from Neuro-Insight on the first 
Conservative and Labour PEBs (Andrew 2015). The Conservatives’ first PEB of the election 
– ‘securing a better future for you, your future and Britain’ - featured positive messages on 
Conservative policy to decrease the deficit and invest in jobs, the NHS, education, the state 
pension and homebuilding. Including David Cameron near the end of the broadcast to 
confirm the centrality of these policies to HIMSELF and HIS Conservative party’s 
aspirations enabled the electorate to see David Cameron the principled man and natural 
leader, not just the politician. Viewers subconscious responses in the Neuro-Insight study 
signalled that the Cameron content of the PEB was an emotional highpoint and highly 
memorable, as well as affirming his leadership qualities; whilst party-policy messages in the 
broadcast held less conviction for viewers (Andrew 2015). With such a powerful advantage, 
it is not surprising that this production format continued into their second and third PEBs, 
with Cameron presenting HIS positive messages about security under HIS Conservatives. 
However in the third PEB, a more negative message nuance was introduced to alert audiences 
to the risk to economic security if Labour was elected. While the fourth and final PEB, 
broadcast 2-days before the election day, still features a sincere and confident David 
Cameron, his message has now become much more negative in highlighting the severe risk to 
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the economy and thus jobs, the NHS and security if any other party is elected. It is only now 
other parties are considered alongside Labour. However the main focus remains the threat of 
a SNP-backed Ed Miliband and Labour wrecking the economy, which is personified by the 
smashing of the economic clock of debt elimination and recovery. Thus this PEB also 
connected with their digital ads:  ‘a recovering economy- don’t let Labour wreck it’; ‘staying 
on the road to a stronger economy’; and Ed Miliband as a puppet of the SNP. The final 
seconds of this PEB show a wistfully smiling Cameron quietly reasoning with audiences to 
vote Conservative at the election to enable HIM to secure THEIR future. 
No other party used digital marketing as strategically or successfully as the 
Conservatives did (Elder and Edmonds 2015). Alongside this it also appeared Conservative 
strategists and activists used a ‘branded content’ approach to de-market Labour leader Ed 
Miliband to the electorate, with unflattering and embarrassing ‘incidents’ posted across all 
Tory partisan channels. Their extensive marketing budget meant they could use multiple 
channels, and particularly digital platforms, to strategically pitch their messages and respond 
immediately to election issues as they unfolded. This gave them a strategic advantage in 
conveying their leader and policies, because of the simplicity of messages facilitated by 
advertising, in contrast to the ‘clutter’ of TV interviews, debates and newspaper coverage that 
can detract from message processing and adoption.  
Overall, under the direction of their chief strategist, Lynton Crosby, the Conservatives 
stuck to their election campaign strategy, using minor adjustments to enhance their impact 
and used the full extent of media communication power to discredit Labour and Ed Miliband, 
who they saw as their strongest opponent. They largely ignored UKIP and saw the LibDems 
as a minor player – successfully ‘stealing’ seats from them via their wider marketing 
campaign. Interestingly then, as the election drew close and commentators and opposing 
party leaders spoke of panic within the Conservative election strategy team, insiders 
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maintained there was no panic, the Conservative team remained very confident they were 
going to win the election (Sinclair 2015). 
 
 
 
The Labour 2015Advertising Campaign  
Labour’s election strategy rotated around five primary issues: the deficit, reducing 
immigration, safeguarding the future of the NHS, increasing living standards and improving 
the future for young people. Within this, Labour positioned itself as representing the needs 
and aspirations of hard working British families hit by the austerity measures implemented by 
the coalition government. Thus their messages focused on boosting the economy, reducing 
economic cuts and protecting public services, e.g. the NHS. This message emphasis was 
evident in both their poster and PEB advertising as well as in other elements of their 
marketing campaign. In January 2015 Douglas Alexander stated the ad posters would focus 
on ‘positive messages of hope’, rather than the typically negative messages epitomized in 
most posters. However, their first official election ad poster - ‘Next time they’ll cut to the 
bone’ - created by their agency Beattie, McGuiness and Bungay, (famous for their 
controversial campaigns), was a policy attack ad against the Conservatives. Designed to 
personify that Conservative cuts to public services would be extremely severe, the bones 
imagery symbolised the NHS was at utmost risk from Conservative ‘bone deep’ spending 
cuts. Similar ads were designed to convey the threat to public services and the NHS under a 
Conservative-led government, for example their ad ‘The doctor can’t see you now’, which 
was a parody of the 1979 Conservative ad ‘Labour isn’t working’. Additionally, Labour’s 
digital ad ‘Are you watching closely’ was a personal attack on David Cameron. This ad 
accused Cameron of his intention to hide behind the other leaders in the debate because ‘his 
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government’s record is not very good’. Set against the background of Westminster, the 
bullet-style presentation of this message in the ad using bold-style red text, rather than 
vocalisation, and a fast-paced music and drum beat, gave their message the interactivity badly 
missing in their poster advertising.  The ad ends with Labour’s unifying proposition of ‘a 
better plan’ embedded in their advertising: ‘Labour has a better plan. We don’t need to hide 
it.’ While this ad enabled this message to be presented in a brutally simple way, as 
commentators and digital strategists observed, Labour’s strategy in ensuring their digital 
messages reached key audiences was limited (Elder and Edmonds 2015; posted YouTube 
comments on the ad 2015). This is likely to be partially the result of their very limited 
marketing budget (compared with the Conservatives), and thus the courting of TV and press 
media to deliver their negative election messages. However Labour also appeared to 
misunderstand the targeting opportunities that social media offers, and thus they underplayed 
their strategic use of it in focusing their election ad messages (Elder and Edmonds 2015).  
A Conservative policy-attack approach was also taken in four out of Labour’s five 
PEBs, with the overarching message ‘this is a choice between the Conservatives failing plan 
and Labour’s better plan. A better future.’ With three of them featuring celebrities and one 
historical-current day reminiscences, these PEBs focused on Labour protecting the NHS, 
raising living standards and giving a better future for youth. No mention was made of Ed 
Miliband; these were party not leader-centric. The Neuro-Insight research on the first Labour 
PEB, featuring Martin Freeman, revealed the absence of Ed Miliband was a problem because 
in viewers’ minds it undermined Labour’s credentials for leadership, whilst strengthening this 
for the Conservatives.  Inevitably this was compounded in their 3 PEBs that adopted this 
message style approach. However the face-to-camera style of Freeman talking about the 
values and morality of Labour resonated as more personally relevant than the family-
orientated message in the Conservative PEB (discussed above)  (Andrew 2015). Utilised in 
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two further celebrity PEBs featuring Labour advocates, perhaps this went some way to 
mitigate the leadership credibility issue created by Miliband’s absence. This is, however, 
unlikely, because advancing strong leadership is fundamental to any election victory.  
As the Conservatives ad posters depicting the threat of Labour leader Ed Miliband as 
a puppet of the Scottish National Party (SNP) were released and intensified by the media, it 
became evident that Ed Miliband needed to effectively establish his leadership qualities to 
govern and the party needed to robustly deny it would be a puppet of the SNP (which it did 
far too late in the last week of the campaign). While Ed Miliband was doing well in the 
opinion polls when the election was called, there were no posters featuring him or his 
credentials to lead the next British government. Within the advertising, this responsibility was 
left to one out of Labour’s five PEBs, leaving other platforms to present their leader, for 
example the leader debates. The fourth PEB – ‘Ed Miliband: A Portrait’ - was aired on April 
28th 2015, eight days before the date of the election, at a point when the tide of public opinion 
was beginning to swing back to Conservative leader David Cameron. This broadcast strongly 
featured discussions about Miliband’s values and why he was ready to offer himself as Prime 
Minister to enable better lives for hardworking people struggling to live and proposer in 
Britain.  In common with the other Labour PEBs, he emphasised the need to protect public 
services, and principally to rescue the NHS from Conservative cuts. Overall Miliband 
presented himself in a somewhat evangelical style as the saviour of Britain who would fight 
to restore hope to struggling hard working families and young adults and safeguard the future 
efficacy of the NHS.   While the allocation of one PEB and no posters was undoubtedly 
partially a strategic decision, similar to 2005 and 2010, Labour strategists presented very little 
of the qualities of their leader to the electorate through the lucidity that the lens of advertising 
accords. Furthermore they did not respond to the SNP taunts through their advertising, and 
neither did they generate responsive digital ads or use the wider media to effectively respond. 
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This created an opportunity for Conservative strategists, who appeared to trap Miliband in the 
glare of their relentless messages portraying his weaknesses and secret willingness to sell 
Westminster to Scotland in order to win the election. Alongside this fear, Miliband also had 
to battle against increasing public fears that Labour was against reducing the deficit (again 
fuelled by the Conservatives and media). Notably, while this reduction might have been 
implied in their PEBs, Labour never directly mentioned it in their advertising rhetoric, an 
omission that did not bode well in the latter days of the election contest. Accordingly, as the 
election date drew closer and his popularity began to recede, his election messages now 
appeared to lack conviction. However, the Labour election campaign team were still very 
confident they would achieve enough votes to form the next British government, and this 
overconfidence was probably detrimental to the receptivity of their messages in the latter 
phase of the election contest.  
   
Analysis of the Conservative and Labour 2015 Advertising Campaigns 
What major issues then arose in the Conservative and Labour advertising campaigns? 
 
Conservative Advertising Campaign 
The Conservatives election victory was attributable, in part, to their marketing 
strategy and their discipline in staying ‘on message’ in their advertising. Using research 
evidence, they understood the electorate’s mindset well. Their policy and leader-attack ad 
messages on the economy and the threat of Miliband selling-out to the SNP resonated with 
Conservative partisans and active voting segments, namely older, more affluent, employed 
and those residing in business-rich constituencies. This was in stark contrast to Labour voter 
demographics. Furthermore, importantly they gained the votes of the undecided, which their 
opponents had hoped to win.  
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Consequently, for those who voted Conservative, the attack messages aided their 
emotional and cognitive impression formation and evaluative decision-making in affirming 
the credibility and their liking of David Cameron and his Conservatives and confirming their 
dislike of Labour and Miliband.  Furthermore the persuasiveness of the advertising was 
compounded considerably by Conservative positive ad messages entailing the positive self-
promotion of David Cameron to draw voters closer to him and his party and motivate them to 
vote for HIM. Therefore inherent within their advertising messages, voters were invited to 
join WITH Cameron to become part of HIS team to secure the future of OUR Britain. This is 
in stark contrast to being governed under a political party and reflects the integration of value 
co-creation and customer experiences inherent within much contemporary commercial 
marketing. Accordingly the objectives of the advertising campaign were met.  
Overall the use of positive and negative message strategies was skilfully played; using 
negative attack messages to reinforce the competencies of David Cameron to govern, and 
positive messages to create liking of him and motivate turnout; thereby stimulating trust. This 
was magnified by the extensive strategic use of digital technology. Overall the charisma of 
David Cameron, and thus his capacity to connect with voters’ intelligence and emotions, was 
the most valuable strategic asset the Conservatives possessed – and this potency was distilled 
throughout the advertising and wider marketing strategy in advancing trustworthiness and 
proficiency. Hence while some of their advertising was criticised for being too overcrowded 
to process, e.g. the PEBs and the road to recovery poster, and too narrowly targeted, this was 
mitigated by the overarching Cameron persuasive effect in winning over voters to Cameron’s 
Conservative party. Therefore, from a strategic marketing perspective, the Conservative 
campaign was far more advanced than Labours. 
 
Labour Advertising Campaign 
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Critics accused the Labour campaign of being out of touch with the fears, aspirations and 
reality of normal working people. It failed to address their concerns on immigration, welfare 
and job creation and instead presented itself as the party for the “needy and greedy” (cited in 
Wintour 2015). Labour was perceived to be demonising the private sector and favouring 
those deliberately choosing not to work, at the expense of ‘hardworking families’. 
Compounding this, critics maintained the campaign messages failed to address austerity and 
the deficit and immigration was taboo (Keeble and Straw 2015). Furthermore, Labour’s 
values were undermined by personifying voters as calculative consumers not citizens - the 
selfish-voter (Dermody & Hanmer-Lloyd 2004). Yet these issues lay at the heart of Labour’s 
campaign, so how valid are these criticisms?  
The advertising campaign focused on the threat to public services, a ‘hiding’ David 
Cameron and the values of Labour and their leader Ed Miliband. This was wrapped within a 
negative policy-attack message style, with elements of personality attack on Cameron, 
alongside some positive voicing on values.  The deficit and austerity were not made explicit 
in any ad messages (albeit they were embedded in some campaign rhetoric), and neither was 
immigration. This suggests key messages advanced by Labour did not connect with the 
publics’ hopes and fears. This was a lost opportunity to use advertising to inform and build 
confidence to grow public trust in Labour. Particularly so because the simplicity in Labour’s 
stripped-back PEB ads had greater capacity to effectively gain attention and avoid 
misunderstanding than the more crowded Conservative ad messages. Their persuasiveness 
might also have increased had these messages contained more positive content to facilitate 
better candidate evaluation and liking of Miliband. Labour’s messages did get through to 
some voter segments however – younger, unemployed, low-earners and ethnic minorities 
(Rudgard 2015), negating some of the criticism of the campaign. Problematically, though, 
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turnout amongst them is historically lower than their affluent older peers and Labour failed to 
attract the ‘undecided’ who determined the election outcome.  
Miliband’s absence from most of Labour’s advertising (except one PEB) was 
damaging, particularly contrasted with a charismatic Cameron who dominated the 
Conservative campaign. For example he could have featured in digital ads rising above the 
Tory SNP jibes and asserting positive messages about a ‘Labour future’, using social media 
more strategically in targeting dissemination of core messages like this.  
Consequently there were three primary weaknesses in the Labour advertising and 
wider marketing campaign. Firstly, failing to communicate convincing and trustworthy 
messages reflexive of the policies and values of the Labour party that would alleviate the 
‘risk-taking fears’ of pro-Labour and non-Conservative voting segments who turnout. 
Secondly, failing to portray Ed Miliband’s leadership competence and trustworthiness to 
convince voters and media of his Prime Ministerial qualities.  Thirdly, failing to revise their 
marketing strategy in light of the Conservative marketing machine. They were never going to 
gain voters by arguing directly with David Cameron. Instead they should have been focusing 
on constructing policy attack and positive messages to win votes from the LibDems and 
UKIP, with messages emphasising belonging with Miliband’s Labour, not being ‘under’ its 
governance. This missed opportunity to provide a viable alternative choice facilitated a big 
swing of LibDem/UKIP voters to the Conservatives; they had nowhere else to go. This 
signalled an arrogance within Labour’s strategic campaign team and hence a profound failure 
to understand the nation they wanted to govern. It is therefore not surprising they lost the 
election, but more fundamentally why they imploded. 
 
Conclusion 
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Ultimately this election was not a choice between parties. It was a contest between the 
credibility of leaders in almost presidential style – an emotive-cognitive appraisal of the 
battle between David Cameron and Ed Miliband. It showcased how positive election 
messages, combined with personalised positive rhetoric and evidence-based policy-attacks, 
can be highly persuasive in engaging and motivating the electorate to vote and in decreasing 
a cynical mindset. Thus it sets further precedent for positive advertising message strategies in 
future election campaigns, thereby addressing some ethical concerns surrounding attack 
advertising. David Cameron’s ownership of the Conservative party showed genius, (as did 
Tony Blair’s ownership of New Labour). It gave strength and intelligence to the campaign 
advertising and marketing by illuminating the party as an extension of the leaders self-
identity, and thus their values and ambitions, and it was this Cameron identity that voters 
wanted to belong to – to be part of Cameron’s in-group.  
 This appraisal reaffirms the importance of advertising in election marketing, and 
digital technology enhances its persuasive power. Accordingly while election advertising is 
likely to metamorphose before the next election, it remains an integral part of strategic 
election marketing, most notably because of its capacity to meaningfully connect voters with 
political leaders across multiple platforms and give them a sense of belonging and 
empowerment.  
So what kind of election advertising will emerge from this metamorphosis? Specifics 
of this evolving species remain fuzzy; however its evolution will be driven by digital 
technology and science.  
Digital technology and social media will facilitate an exponential increase in the 
positive and negative ‘political stories’ told about human interactions with MPs, parties and 
their policies. Consequently, advertising could hybridise into a mixture of marketing 
messages, entertainment and education.  This future is already here via branded content.  
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Building on this, advances in neuroscience increase comprehension of the 
neurological impact of political messages on the human brain, and thus how to ‘switch it on 
and off’ and to activate it at a higher level. Currently much neuromarketing focuses on the 
basic human reptilian brain (amygdala), which entails instant gratification of consumers’ 
primeval human instincts, for example attack ads declaring ‘don’t vote for them, you will pay 
more tax’. However, neuroscience offers more than this; it enables greater understanding of 
how the ‘superior human brain (the cortex) functions to enable our empathic-thinking-
mindful selves. Hence, this new election advertising will have evolved to interact with this 
deeper human self, thereby helping to advance democratic engagement. This is in-line with 
experiential, relational and co-creation developments within marketing and it may well 
negate the use of personalised attack ad messages and much greater use of positive messages. 
In the future it will be voters and their stakeholders who will be the change agents – 
the storytellers - not politicians and their strategy and media agents.  These tales will embrace 
advertisings narrative roots to stimulate cognitive and emotional connectivity among electoral 
stakeholders. Thus, the technological-scientific metamorphosis of advertising will enable it to 
do what it does best – give humans the stories that enable them to make connections with 
what is good for themselves, society and democracy.  
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Links to a selection of Conservative and Labour election advertising 
All 2015 party election broadcasts can be found online. They are currently accessible on 
BBCiplayer until summer 2016: www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer 
 
Conservative:  
The road to a stronger economy: http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/jan/02/tories-go-
for-country-road-to-take-the-economic-message-home#img-2  
A recovering economy: www.youtube.com/watch?v=seYDn3L2UKc  
Alex Salmond: ready to "call the tune”:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6JeYlBRvUeE&feature=youtu.be  
Ed Miliband as SNP puppet: 
https://twitter.com/Conservatives/status/589703032427978752/photo/1  
 
Labour: 
Next time they’ll cut to the bone:  
http://labourlist.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/unnamed4-440x220.jpg 
Are you watching closely: www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wgf_Sj5f_AE 
The doctor can’t see you now:: http://labourlist.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/04/unnamed.png 
 
 
 
 
